

and analytical philosophy is not really going to help much—if Prosch could find someone to do it for him (who will merge the foe?). So what we can hope for is (1) technological prowess (pleasant surprises?) or (2) atomic obliteration.

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Karl Marx, by Karl Korsch. New York: Russell & Russell, 1963. \$6.00.
Pp. 247.

This is a reissue of Korsch's interpretation of Marx, first published in 1938 by Chapman & Hall for Professor Morris Ginsberg's series of sociological studies. Its original appearance came at an inopportune time, as the ensuing war and its aftermath greatly diminished the interest in Marxian theory. Moreover, the British edition was almost completely destroyed during the London *Blitz*, and only three hundred copies were distributed by John Wiley & Sons in the United States. The book became a rarity and its reappearance at this time—after its author's death—is highly warranted not only on its own merits but also as a necessary counterweight to many recently-published, rather worthless expositions of Marxism.

Korsch's *Karl Marx* is, perhaps, the richest and at the same time the most concentrated study in this field. Despite the auspices under which it was first published, it denies any connection between Marxism and what is generally considered to be the science of sociology. Its concern is with the original ideas of Marx rather than with their subsequent development at the hands of his epigones, even though the latter are not entirely neglected and, wherever opportune, Marx's ideas are viewed in the light of recent historical events.

The book is divided into three parts: Society, Political Economy, and History. With regard to Society it organizes itself around the principles of specification, change, and criticism. According to Korsch, Marx comprehended all things social in terms of a definite historical epoch; i.e., all the categories of his economic and socio-historical research are dealt with in that specific form and in that specific connection in which they appear in modern bourgeois society. The principle of specification does not exclude theoretical generalizations, only that, in Marx's view, as Korsch relates, "the 'general' of the concept is no longer set up against concrete reality as another realm; but every 'general', even in its conceptual form, necessarily remains a specific aspect or a mentally dissected part of the historical concrete of existing bourgeois society."

The only possible way of comprehending the general laws of a particular historical form of society is through its actual historical change, and Marx, Korsch says, treats all conditions of existing bourgeois society as *changing* or, more exactly, as conditions *being changed* by human actions. The bourgeois conditions are the specific conditions of a *transitory* phase in a historical process. This provides the theoretical basis for a critical examination of the structure of present-day society.

In Korsch's view, the principle of specification turns Marxism itself into a transitory theory of capitalist society as a transitory phase of historical development. Because it deals "with all ideas as being connected with a definite historical epoch and the specific form of society pertaining to that epoch, it recognizes itself as being just as much a historical product as any other theory pertaining to a definite stage of social development and to a definite social class." It is this historical character of Marxism which precludes its dogmatization.

In distinction to the traditional concept of an absolute truth, Korsch points out, Marx's materialistic science defines all theoretical truth as mere historical forms of social consciousness. Every truth applies only to a definite set of conditions, and today's truth depends upon the existing mode of production and the class struggle arising therefrom. By insisting on the principle of specification and on the constancy of change, Marx's materialistic criticism achieves in a theoretical way what is achieved by the real historical movement of the proletariat. Marxism is, thus, at once, a new science of bourgeois society and a theory of the impending proletarian revolution.

Marx's materialistic investigation of bourgeois society is based on his recognition of the cardinal importance of political economy, which, however, remains a bourgeois science even in Marx's own contributions to its further development. As Korsch relates, Marx fought to the end against the mistaken idea that his economic analysis of value and surplus-value applies to any other than bourgeois conditions. For the working class, political economy is first and foremost "enemy country." If it has to be entered, it is not for the realizations of working-class ends but in order to destroy it. The Marxian development of classical economy derives its importance, Korsch writes, not from being a formal advance over the classical concepts, but through its definite transfer of economic thought from the field of exchange of commodities to the field of material production taken in its full social significance.

For Marx, Korsch states, the most general ideas and principles of political economy are mere fetishes that disguise the actual social relations prevailing between individuals and classes within a definite his-

torical epoch of the socio-economic formation. The theoretical exposure of the fetishistic character of commodities is not only the kernel of the Marxian critique of political economy, but at the same time the quintessence of the economic theory of capital and the most explicit and most exact definition of the theoretical and historical standpoint of the whole materialistic science of society.

All of Marx's various innovations in the sphere of economic theory, Korsch shows in great detail, serve the ultimate aim of a critical transformation of economics into a direct historical and social science dealing with the development of material production and of the class struggle. In two short but pithy chapters, dealing with the theory of value and surplus-value, and with the various misunderstandings associated therewith, Korsch elucidates the full meaning of Marx's economic theories with reference to the present, illusory, capitalist "planning" attempts, which can only still further disrupt the "order" that is peculiar to capitalism and that is brought about by the blind necessities of a fetishistic law of value.

In the book's final part, Korsch deals with Marx's materialistic conception of history. Here, too, Korsch says, the principle of specification prevails, particularly because the science of Marx is a "critical" rather than a positive science. Even where Marx departs from that purely critical position, he does not lay down any general proposition as to the essential nature of all society but merely describes the particular conditions and developmental tendencies inherent in the historical form of contemporary bourgeois society. The critical principle of Marx's *social science* was, during the subsequent development of Marxism, converted into a general *social philosophy*. But Korsch demonstrates that Marx's materialistic science, being a strictly empirical investigation into definite historical forms of society, does not need philosophical support. This demonstration incorporates the genesis of historical materialism and its progressive development from Hegel through Feuerbach to Marx, in conjunction with the latter's criticism of classical economy, and ends with the Marxian conviction that the emancipation of the working class "cannot result from any change of the existing political, legal, and cultural conditions, but must be brought about by the workers themselves through a social revolution penetrating to the economic basis of existing bourgeois society."

Notwithstanding Marx's unquestioned acceptance of the genetic priority of external nature to all historical and human events, Marxism, according to Korsch, is primarily interested only in the phenomena and interrelations of historical and social life, where it can enter as a prac-

tical, influential force. Physical nature does not directly enter history. It does so by indirection, i.e., as a process of material production which goes on not only between man and nature, but at the same time between man and man. For Marx, "pure nature" is replaced everywhere by a "nature" mediated and modified through human social activity—by nature as material production.

The book closes with an exposition of the Marxian distinction between productive force and productive relations, and with their counterpart, the relations between the economic basis and the political and ideological superstructure of bourgeois society. Both topics are discussed in connection with Marx's theory of capital accumulation as the road to the expected destruction of bourgeois society. With the greatest economy, and in an entirely original way, Korsch succeeds in comprehending and relating all that is essential to Marxism. This work will be of lasting interest to those agreeing, as well as to those disagreeing, with its author's particular interpretation of Marxian doctrine.

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The Cry for Justice, by Upton Sinclair, New York: Lyle Stuart Book Publishers, 1964. \$10.00. Pp. 638.

In his introduction to the first edition, completed March 6, 1915, Jack London said: "There will be much adding, there will be a little subtracting, in the succeeding editions that are bound to come. The result will be a monument of the ages, and there will be none fairer."

This year's welcome republication of this unique work, overlong out of print, has been well advised in its successful attempt to keep change at a minimum so that only some 7500 lines have been dropped—an omission necessitated by the addition of as many lines of new material.

The cuts have been judicious, and even though every old friend may want to query some particular omission no one is likely to quarrel with the general pattern of selection here. But the principles which were, apparently, used to determine the admission of new material do demand some critical consideration.

In general each new selection seems to have satisfied at least one of three criteria. The first is simply a chronological one, intended to give some recognition to authors not yet published in 1915. The very inadequate verses chosen to represent Bertolt Brecht, for example, and most